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Flourishing as a dialectical balance: emerging
insights from second-wave positive psychology
Tim Lomas1
ABSTRACT Positive psychology, an emergent branch of scholarship concerned with well-
being and ﬂourishing, initially deﬁned itself by a focus on “positive” emotions and qualities.
However, critics soon pointed out that this binary logic—classifying phenomena as either
positive or negative, and valorising the former while disparaging the latter—could be pro-
blematic. For example, apparently positive qualities can be harmful to wellbeing in certain
circumstances, while ostensibly dysphoric emotional states may on occasion promote
ﬂourishing. Responding to these criticisms, over recent years a more nuanced “second wave”
of positive psychology has been developing, in which wellbeing is recognized as involving a
dialectical balance of light and dark aspects of life. This article introduces this emergent
second wave, arguing that it is characterized by four dialectical principles. First, the principle
of appraisal states that it is difﬁcult to categorically identify phenomena as either positive or
negative, since such appraisals are fundamentally contextually dependent. Second, the
principle of co-valence holds that many states and qualities at the heart of ﬂourishing, such as
love, are actually a complex blend of light and dark elements. Third, the principle of com-
plementarity posits that not only are such phenomena co-valenced, but that their dichot-
omous elements are in fact co-creating, two intertwined sides of the same coin. Finally, the
principle of evolution allows us to understand second-wave positive psychology as itself
being an example of a dialectical process. This article is published as part of a collection
entitled “On balance: lifestyle, mental health and wellbeing”.
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The evolution of positive psychology
Just before the dawn of the new millennium, Martin Seligmanused his ascension to the presidency of the AmericanPsychological Association to inaugurate a bold new initiative:
positive psychology (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000). The
rationale for its creation was Seligman’s perceptive—if not
universally endorsed—contention that mainstream psychology
had hitherto tended to mainly concern itself with disorder and
dysfunction. Certain ﬁelds had resisted this trend of course,
focusing instead on human potential and excellence, such as
humanistic psychology (Waterman, 2013). Nevertheless, on the
whole, Seligman argued that concepts like happiness and
ﬂourishing were largely absent in mainstream psychology,
removed from serious consideration, and regarded disparagingly
by gatekeepers such as grant-awarding bodies. And so, Seligman
used his inﬂuence and prominence to propose the notion of
positive psychology as a way of redressing this lacuna. It swiftly
became a fertile new paradigm, offering a “collective identity” for
researchers interested in “the brighter sides of human nature” as
Linley and Joseph (2004: 4) put it. As the ﬁeld grew, it began to
encompass research—much of which pre-dated the ﬁeld itself—
around diverse processes and qualities that could be deemed
“positive”, from overarching constructs such as ﬂourishing, to
more speciﬁc concepts like optimism and hope.
As intimated above, it was not the case that this research was
necessarily new. Before positive psychology strode boldly onto the
scene, many of these topics had already been studied empiri-
cally by scholars in disparate ﬁelds, from humanistic to clinical
psychology. Moreover, its central concerns—the nature of well-
being and the good life—had been debated by scholars for cen-
turies, millennia even (McMahon, 2006). However, part of the
attraction and power of the new ﬁeld was that it created a con-
ceptual space where these diverse topics—all of which shared the
“family resemblance” (Wittgenstein, 1953) of pertaining in some
way to wellbeing—could be brought together and considered
collectively. Thus, as a new ﬁeld of enquiry focused speciﬁcally on
“the science and practice of improving wellbeing” (Lomas et al.,
2015: 1347), positive psychology found an enthusiastic response
among students and scholars within psychology, and indeed in
other ﬁelds, from education to social work (Lomas, 2015b).
However, the ﬁeld was not without its critics. Some argued
that its conceptualizations of wellbeing were culturally speciﬁc—
inﬂuenced by the North American context in which the ﬁeld
emerged—and yet the ﬁeld tended to presume that these concepts
were universally and perennially applicable (Becker and Marecek,
2008; Lomas, 2015a). Others accused the ﬁeld of promulgating a
“separatist” agenda, positioning itself as radically different to
previous scholarship, and failing to recognize or engage with
pertinent research in other ﬁelds (Cowen and Kilmer, 2002; Held,
2004). Another line of criticism was that the ﬁeld tended towards
the promotion of an individuation of social problems, and as such
that it was aligned with a neo-liberal political agenda (McDonald
and O’Callaghan, 2008). However, while there may be some merit
to these claims, at least initially, it is also important to note that the
ﬁeld is responding receptively to these critiques. Objections around
cultural bias are being addressed through the emergence of sub-
ﬁelds like “positive cross-cultural psychology” (Lomas, 2015a),
featuring analyses of phenomena such as linguistic differences in
well-being related concepts (Lomas, 2016b). Critiques around the
separatism of the ﬁeld have led to attempts to build bridges with
other ﬁelds, from “positive education” (Seligman et al., 2009) to
“positive art” (Lomas, 2016a), which recognize the extensive work
pertaining to wellbeing that has already happened within
disciplines such as educational psychology and art therapy. Finally,
the issue of individuation of social problems has given rise to
more critical perspectives within the ﬁeld, as highlighted by a
forthcoming Handbook of Critical Positive Psychology (Brown
et al., 2016), and the emergence of new sub-disciplines such as
“positive social psychology” (Lomas, 2015b).
One of the most insightful and interesting critiques concerned
the very notion of “positive” which underpinned the entire ﬁeld,
as articulated in particular by scholars such as Held (2002; 2004).
The accusation was that positive psychology was promulgating a
rather polarizing positive-negative dichotomy. Certain phenom-
ena, emotions for example, were being labeled as positive,
presented as inherently desirable and thus to be cultivated.
The necessary corollary, of course, is that contrasting phenomena
were implicitly conceptualized as negative, positioned as
intrinsically undesirable and to be avoided. For example,
optimism often appeared to be valorized as an unqualiﬁed good,
and pessimism as intrinsically deleterious. It is true that some
scholars did paint a more nuanced picture; for instance, Seligman
(1990: 292) himself cautioned that one must be wary of being a
“slave to the tyrannies of optimism”, and that one needs to be
“able to use pessimism’s keen sense of reality when we need it”.
However, in terms of the broader discourse of the ﬁeld, and its
wider cultural impact, a less nuanced binary message—the
simplistic valorization of ostensibly positive phenomena—
appeared to be dominant.
Although this valorization of positivity seemed to offer an
upbeat message—that positive emotions are linked to beneﬁcial
outcomes in multiple arenas, from health (Fredrickson and
Levenson, 1998) to success (Boehm and Lyubomirsky, 2008)—
critics saw it as problematic. First, it often failed to appreciate
sufﬁciently the context and complexity of emotional outcomes. For
instance, “excessive” optimism can be harmful to wellbeing,
particularly when it contributes to an under appreciation of risk
and to subsequent health-risk behaviors such as smoking
(Weinstein et al., 2005). Conversely, pessimism and anxiety may
engender forms of proactive coping that are beneﬁcial to wellbeing
(Norem, 2001). Of even greater concern was Held’s (2002: 965)
contention that this emphasis on positivity contributed to a
“tyranny of the positive”—that is, to a cultural expectation that one
should be upbeat—which had deleterious consequences. For
instance, Held argued that it fed into a climate in which people
who could not ﬁnd or express the requisite positivity might face
social censure and even ostracism. Similarly, in her polemic against
positivity, sociologist Ehrenreich (2009) accused companies of
compelling positive thinking as a way of hindering dissent, and a
means of cajoling more out of workers. Perhaps most perniciously,
this “tyranny” added to a larger cultural discourse in which
negative emotional states are not simply seen as undesirable, but as
disorders. This discourse is part of a broader medicalization of
existence, reﬂecting the cultural hegemony of medical ﬁelds such as
psychiatry. As Horwitz andWakeﬁeld (2007) suggest in The Loss of
Sadness, emotions that were previously regarded as natural and
inherent aspects of the human condition, from sadness to grief,
have largely been re-framed as disorders, and certainly as
problematic. And, it could be argued that positive psychology
contributed, albeit perhaps unwittingly, to this process.
Second-wave positive psychology
If the very notion of “positive” is problematic, where does this
leave positive psychology? Perhaps for some of the critics mentioned
above, these criticisms might deﬁnitively undermine the ﬁeld.
However, an alternative perspective would be that such critiques in
fact facilitate a more nuanced appreciation of the dynamics of
ﬂourishing. This is the view taken by myself and my colleagues.
Challenged and provoked by these critiques, we feel that the ﬁeld
is responding receptively, evolving into what we call “second-
wave” positive psychology (SWPP) (Wong, 2011; Lomas and
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Ivtzan, 2015; Ivtzan et al., 2015). If the “ﬁrst wave” incarnation of
the ﬁeld can be deﬁned by valorization of the positive, SWPP
recognizes that ﬂourishing instead involves a complex balance, a
subtle, dialectical interplay between ostensibly positive and
negative phenomena. Or rather, while this recognition may have
been implicit in the ﬁrst wave of the ﬁeld, SWPP involves making
it explicit. This second wave is still very much positive psychology:
its overarching concern remains with “positive” meta-constructs
and goals such as ﬂourishing and wellbeing. It simply acknowl-
edges that the routes towards these luminous destinations can be
complicated, and sometimes lead through “darker” realms of
human experience. More speciﬁcally, SWPP is underpinned by
four dialectical principles: appraisal; co-valence; complementarity;
and evolution.
The principle of appraisal cautions against categorically
identifying phenomena as either positive or negative, since such
appraisals are fundamentally contextually dependent. This was
alluded to above, where it was noted that “excessive” optimism
can lead to miscalculations of risk, whereas pessimism can be
advantageous if it leads to prudence. One could problematize
most emotional dichotomies in this way. For instance, McNulty
and Fincham (2011) show that prosocial emotions like forgive-
ness can be problematic if it means one tolerates a situation that
one might otherwise resist, such as a harmful relationship. Con-
versely, “anti-social” states like anger may be “moral emotions”,
which can alert us to ethical breaches, and motivate us to resist
iniquities (Tavris, 1989). Indeed, “righteous” anger has been
identiﬁed as a crucial driver of progressive change, inspiring
and propelling social movements that have changed the world
for the better, from Civil Rights to feminism (Siegel, 2009).
Likewise, consider the polarity of freedom versus restraint. While
the total deprivation of freedom, as in slavery, is surely an
unqualiﬁed evil, existentialist thinkers have argued that an excess
of freedom, a life untrammelled by restrictions, can be troubling
(Yalom, 1980). For instance, Kierkegaard (1834) felt that this
“dizzying” sense of unlimited possibilities could engender
ontological “dread”, since we must continually make choices that
irrevocably shape our lives, and assume responsibility for the
consequences. As Sartre (1952: 399) put it, people are
“condemned to be free”. In a more mundane but no less
revealing way, Schwartz (2000: 79) reports that “excessive”
consumer freedom can be experienced “as a kind of tyranny”,
with empirical studies suggesting that a greater diversity of choice
often leads to lower levels of subsequent satisfaction (Iyengar and
Lepper, 1999).
Even happiness and sadness are not immune from such
considerations around the principle of appraisal. There is a risk,
for example, that superﬁcial forms of happiness, such as
hedonistic pleasure, might forestall efforts to pursue deeper states
of wellbeing that might ultimately prove more fulﬁlling (Wong,
2009). Or such pleasures might tranquilize us into acquiescing to
social contexts that ultimately undermine our wellbeing, beguiling
us by modest satisfactions into entering what Marxist theorists
call “false consciousness,” that is, a state of mind that prevents us
from acting in our own interests (Jost, 1995). Thus, for instance,
there is the accusation that consumer capitalism provides “the
99%” with just enough recompense to prevent people from
revolting en masse against a socio-economic system that
systemically serves to fundamentally limit their wellbeing
(DeLuca et al., 2012). Conversely, at times, sadness may be
thoroughly appropriate, such as in response to loss, where grief is
not only normal, but may actually maintain and honour one’s
connection to a departed loved one (Thieleman and Cacciatore,
2014). Similarly, sadness may be valuable as a humane reaction to
suffering (Christiansen et al., 2010), or a reﬁned aesthetic response to
the ephemeral beauty of the world (Thoolen et al., 2009). Dwelling
on such paradoxes, clear-cut determinations of “positive” and
“negative” become harder to make.
Moreover, it is not just that such appraisals are difﬁcult. The
second principle of co-valence reﬂects the idea that many
phenomena are complex admixtures of light and dark, positive
and negative. Consider perhaps the way that hope involves a
yearning optimism for a future goal, which is yet undercut with a
gnawing anxiety that it may not come to pass (Lazarus, 2003).
Such co-valence is perhaps most powerfully revealed in arguably
the most cherished and exalted of all human phenomena: love.
While there are many different forms of love—from the passion
of eros to the selﬂessness of agape (Lee, 1977)—all can perhaps be
understood as being a dialectical blend of light and dark. One
might approach this dialectic in various ways, but all are
essentially reﬂected in the poignant lamentation of C. S. Lewis
(1971) that, “To love at all is to be vulnerable. Love anything and
your heart will be wrung and possibly broken”. Love can be
troubled by the vicissitudes of fate in all kinds of ways, from
enforced partings to an erosion of feelings over time. Thus, even
while love contains pleasure, joy and bliss, it is also infused with
worry, anxiety and fear. It is, as such, co-valenced, harbouring
darker shades of feeling. This recognition leads us inexorably to
the third principle: complementarity. Here we recognize that the
potential dysphoria and vulnerability inherent in love are not
aberrations, but the very condition of it. The light and dark of
love are fundamentally inseparable, complementary and co-
creating sides of the same coin. Consider that the stronger and
more intense one’s love for another, the greater the risk of
heartbreak were the relationship to end against one’s will. As
Bauman (2013: 6) eloquently puts it, “to love means opening up
to that most sublime of all human conditions, one in which fear
blends with joy into an alloy that no longer allows its ingredients
to separate”.
With this third principle, we are in dialectical territory that has
been explored with particular depth and insight by Eastern
philosophies, especially Taoism. Taoism has its roots in the I
Ching, or “Book of Changes”, which began life over 3000 years ago
as a shamanic practice among the Chou people, based on the
practice of consulting oracles (Wilhelm, 1950). The overarching
philosophical principle of the I Ching is change, which,
paradoxically, is the one eternal, immutable law at work in the
universe. Moreover, the I Ching identiﬁed the mechanism through
which change occurs: the dialectical interaction between opposites
(Fang, 2012). This dialectical interaction was subsequently
captured symbolically by the yin-yang motif (although the terms
themselves do not appear in the book; instead we ﬁnd dichotomies
such as “the ﬁrm” and “the yielding”). Yin means cloudy/overcast,
whereas Yang means “in the sun” (that is, shone upon), implying
the two sides of a mountain (one sunlit, one in shadow). Thus, as
Fang (2012) explains, yin-yang encapsulates various “tenets of
duality”. The tenet of “holistic duality” means that reality
comprises co-dependent opposites that each require the other for
their existence (for, “up” depends upon the notion of “down”).
Moreover, the tenet of “dynamic duality” holds that these opposites
tend to mutually transform into each other in a dynamic process;
as Fung (1948: 19) puts it, “When the sun has reached its meridian,
it declines” (that is, its zenith heralds the beginning of the descent
into night). Thus, yin-yang does not simply present a pair of
static opposites, but includes an element of darkness in the light,
and vice versa, capturing the ceaseless process of becoming. As Ji
et al. (2001: 450) put it, “The pure yin is hidden in yang, and the
pure yang is hidden in yin”. Such considerations beautifully
encapsulate the principle of complementarity, which can arguably
be applied to all emotional dichotomies that combine to constitute
ﬂourishing, from optimism versus pessimism to freedom versus
restriction.
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Finally, the principle of evolution allows us to contextualize the
very idea of SWPP. Just as SWPP is deﬁned by an appreciation of
dialectics, it is itself an example of a dialectical process. Here I
refer to the dialectical movement of thesis-antithesis-synthesis
associated with G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831). One might view
mainstream psychology, with its apparent concern with “nega-
tive” aspects of human functioning, as the thesis. In critiquing this
and embracing ostensibly positive phenomena, positive psychol-
ogy presented itself as the antithesis. However, critics subse-
quently began to discern ﬂaws in this antithesis, as elucidated
above, pointing out the pitfalls of positive qualities and the
potential merits of negative ones. Crucially though, from a
Hegelian perspective, this does not necessarily mean an
abandonment of positive psychology, a reversion back to the
original thesis. Rather, the next stage in this dialectical process is
ideally synthesis, in which the truths of both thesis and antithesis
are preserved, while the ﬂaws in their respective positions are
overcome. And, one might argue, SWPP is just such a synthesis:
there is a movement away from a binary classiﬁcation of
phenomena as either positive and negative—valorizing the former
while condemning the latter—towards a more nuanced apprecia-
tion of the dialectical complexities of ﬂourishing.
Conclusion
This article has provided a summary of SWPP, which is
characterized above all by appreciation of the dialectical nature
of wellbeing (supported by subsidiary elements, such as a crit-
ical attention to context). It was suggested that this dialectical
appreciation centres on three key components: the principle of
appraisal (the difﬁculty of categorising phenomena as either
positive or negative), the principle of co-valence (the notion that
many experiences involve a blend of positive and negative
elements), and the principle of complementarity (the idea that
wellbeing and ﬂourishing depend upon a complex balance of light
and dark aspects of life). In addition, SWPP itself was seen as the
manifestation of a fourth dialectical principle, namely evolution,
in that it is a synthesis, emerging from the interaction of
“psychology as usual” (the thesis) and positive psychology (the
antithesis). These considerations show the way in which positive
psychology is evolving as a discipline, and point the way ahead to
future scholarship on the nature of wellbeing.
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